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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, : Case No. 960767-CA 
v. : 
HENRY GALETKA, Warden, : Priority No. 3 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of the petition he filed 
pursuant to rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65B (R. 183-
84). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(f) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly excuse petitioner's 
untimely filing where the trial court applied the exception to 
the applicable statute of limitations in a way that effectively 
nullified the statute? 
The timeliness of a cause of a action under the applicable 
statute of limitations presents a question of law. Gramlich v. 
Munsey. 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992). 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that petitioner's 
guilty plea to second-degree felony evidence tampering waived his 
statute of limitations defense? Alternatively, did the criminal 
statute of limitations bar petitioner's plea to evidence 
1 
tampering where petitioner agreed to plead to that charge and it 
arose out of the same events supporting the original and timely-
filed aggravated murder charge? 
Because this issue involves interpreting statutes and rules, 
this Court reviews the trial courtfs determination for 
correctness. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858-59 (1995). 
3. Where petitioner predicated his ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim on the mistaken premise that the criminal 
statute of limitations precluded his guilty plea to evidence 
tampering and alleged no facts to establish prejudice, did the 
trial court correctly reject that claim? 
The Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for 
correctness and factual findings for clear error. Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 
(1994). The trial courtfs determination that counsel performed 
effectively presents a mixed question of law and fact; therefore, 
this Court makes an independent determination of the trial 
court's conclusions, but reviews its factual findings for clear 
error only. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) . 
4. Where petitioner never filed a direct appeal from the 
trial court's order requiring him to reimburse the county for the 
costs of his defense and has alleged no unusual circumstances to 
excuse his procedural default? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-3 02 
(1995), 77-32a-2 (1995), and 78-35a-107 (1996). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By information dated October 23, 1986, the State charged 
petitioner with aggravated murder, a capital offense, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1986) (R. 17, Crim. R. 
1A) .l A copy of the information is attached as addendum B. On 
May 12, 1989, a jury convicted petitioner of capital murder and 
the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment (R. 18). 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a 
new trial. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991). Pursuant 
to a plea agreement, petitioner pleaded to manslaughter, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1986), 
and evidence tampering, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1986) in exchange for the State's 
agreement not to retry him on the aggravated murder charge (R. 
15-16; Crim. R. 2127-35) . Copies of the plea agreement and 
defendant's statement in support of change of plea are attached 
as addenda C and D respectively. The State filed an amended 
information to reflect the charges to which petitioner agreed to 
plead (Crim. R. 2125-26). A copy of the amended information is 
attached as addendum E. 
On September 8, 1993, the sentencing court sentenced 
petitioner to two consecutive statutory terms of one to fifteen 
years (R. 6-7; Crim. R. 2143-44). A copy of the judgment is 
Although the original criminal record has been made part of 
the record on this appeal, it was not separately numbered for 
this appeal. Therefore, references to that record will be cited 
as "Crim. R." and will cite to the appeal numbers for that 
record. 
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attached as addendum F. The court also ordered petitioner to pay 
restitution to the victim1s mother for the cost of burying their 
son and to reimburse Cache County $160,000 (id). 
Petitioner appealed neither the plea nor the sentence. 
On May 24, 1996, petitioner filed a petition for 
extraordinary relief (R. 17- 41). The State moved to dismiss the 
petition as untimely (R. 54-60). See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 
(1995) . After a hearing, the trial court waived the one year 
limitations period, but concluded that all of petitioner's claims 
were meritless and dismissed the petition (R. 177-185). The 
trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final 
Order is attached as addendum G. 
Petitioner timely filed his notice of appeal from the 
dismissal of his petition (R. 186).2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
The historical facts have little relevance to the issues on 
appeal. Briefly, petitioner claimed that someone had kidnaped 
his infant son whom he had actually murdered, then led his entire 
community on a search for his murdered son until duck hunters 
2The original petition also challenged the Board's 
determination of his first hearing date, alleging that the Board 
failed to give him credit for the time he had already served. 
However, the Board corrected that error, and the issue is now 
moot (R. 181). 
3Because the trial court dismissed the petition without an 
evidentiary hearing, the State relies on many of petitioner's 
factual assertions. For purposes of this appeal only, the State 
does not contest the assertions cited. However, the State does 
not waive its right to contest any of petitioner's assertions if 
this case is remanded for further proceedings. 
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found the infant's submerged body at the Bear River Marina 
wrapped in a mattress cover from petitioner's home. See State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991). 
The Utah Supreme Court overturned petitioner's original 
aggravated murder conviction and ordered a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence that a prosecution witness may have 
perjured himself. Id. at 795. 
In July 1993, prior to trial, the parties commenced plea 
negotiations (R. 1). The State offered to let petitioner to 
plead to two second degree felonies in exchange for its agreement 
not to retry petitioner on the original aggravated murder charge 
(R. 236). The State told petitioner that a single second degree 
felony would not be sufficient (id.). 
The State initially offered to allow petitioner to plead 
guilty to manslaughter and perjury (R. 1). Petitioner agreed to 
the proposal; however, according to petitioner, his counsel 
discovered that the statute of limitations barred the perjury 
plea (R. 224). Consequently, the parties substituted evidence 
tampering for perjury as the additional second degree felony(R. 
15-16, 224, 236). The State filed an amended information to 
reflect the new charges (Crim. R. 2125-26). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Timeliness of petition. Although the trial court 
rejected the State's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely, 
this Court may affirm the trial court's ultimate decision to 
dismiss the petition on any grounds, including one that the trial 
5 
court rejected. 
The trial court inappropriately applied the statute of 
limitations1 "interests-of-justice" exception to excuse 
petitioner's untimely filing. The grounds on which the trial 
court relied sweep too broadly, making the exception to the time 
limitation swallow the rule. Moreover, the broad construction 
contradicts the narrow construction given to identical language 
in other contexts. 
2. Timeliness of amended criminal information. Petitioner 
challenges his plea to evidence tampering, arguing that the 
criminal statute of limitations rendered that plea illegal. The 
trial court rejected this argument. 
No Utah case has directly analyzed whether a criminal 
defendant may waive the protections of the statute of 
limitations. Moreover, other states have split on this issue. 
However, the majority of jurisdictions favor allowing a 
criminal defendant to waive the statute's protections. This 
Court should adopt that rule because: 1) it recognizes that the 
statute principally protects a defendant from having to defend 
against stale claims, and that a defendant should have the right 
to waive those protections; and 2) it is consistent with the 
broad latitude given to the parties in formulating plea 
agreements, including allowing a criminal defendant to plead to 
crimes that he could not have committed. 
Alternatively, the evidence tampering charge was not 
untimely. That charge arose out of the same occurrences on which 
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the State based the original, timely information. Therefore, the 
amendment related back to the original information. 
3. Ineffective assistance. Petitioner contends that his 
counsel performed ineffectively for allowing him to plead to an 
illegal charge. For the reasons argued in Point II, the evidence 
tampering charge was not illegal. Therefore, counsel did not 
perform deficiently for advising petitioner to plead to it. 
Moreover, petitioner has not argued that he would have 
rejected the plea and gone to trial on the original aggravated 
murder charge if he had known that the statute of limitations 
applied to the evidence tampering charge, or that, had he gone to 
trial, he stood a reasonable chance of success. Therefore, he 
has alleged insufficient facts to establish that counsel's 
performance undermines confidence in the outcome. This failure 
independently defeats his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. 
4. Reimbursement to Cache County. Petitioner contends that 
the trial court erroneously ordered him to reimburse Cache County 
for the expenses it incurred for his defense. Petitioner attacks 
both the statute supporting the award and the procedure by which 
the trial court made the award. 
Petitioner did not attack the award at the time the trial 
court made it and took no direct appeal from it. Petitioner 
fails to identify any unusual circumstances excusing this 
procedural default. Therefore, petitioner is procedurally barred 
from raising the claim for the first time in a petition for post-
7 
conviction relief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE "INTERESTS 
OF JUSTICE" EXCEPTION TO THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS EXCUSED PETITIONER'S UNTIMELY FILING; 
NEVERTHELESS, THIS COURT MAY AFFIRM THE DISMISSAL OF 
THE PETITION BY PROPERLY APPLYING THAT STATUTE4 
A petitioner must file his petition for post-conviction 
relief within one year after his cause of action accrues. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(1) (1996). Petitioner filed his petition 
on May 24, 1996 (R. 17), one year and fifteen days after the one-
year statute became effective. Id. The State moved to dismiss 
the petition based solely on petitioner's failure to file it 
within the statutory period (R. 58-59) . Although the trial court 
agreed that petitioner had not filed his petition within the 
statutory period, it refused to apply the statutory bar, finding 
that the statutory "interests-of-justice" exception to the one-
year period excused petitioner's untimely filing (R. 182). Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (3) (1996).5 Nevertheless, the trial court 
dismissed the petition on its merits (R. 177-84). 
Although the trial court rejected the State's motion to 
dismiss based on the petition's untimeliness, this Court may 
affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition on any 
4If the Court affirms the dismissal on this basis, it need 
not consider petitioner's other claims. 
Petitioner never asserted that he had filed the petition 
timely. Instead, he only offered reasons why the trial court 
should excuse his untimely filing (R. 66-72). 
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alternative ground, even one that the trial court rejected. 
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 356-57 (Utah 1996).6 Thus, this 
Court may affirm the trial courtfs dismissal of the petition 
based on the expiration of the statute of limitations even though 
the trial court rejected that argument below. 
This Court reviews the trial courtfs interpretation of the 
statute of limitations for correctness. Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 
P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992). The trial court incorrectly 
interpreted the statute because its interpretation effectively 
nullifies the limitations period. 
The one-year statute of limitations governing petitions for 
post-conviction relief permits a trial court to excuse an 
untimely filing in "the interests of justice." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-35a-107(3) (1996). The trial court applied that exception on 
the following reasoning: 1) petitioner had no actual or 
constructive notice of the statutory period due to petitioner's 
incarceration; and 2) filing the petition fifteen days after the 
statutory period "was not an unreasonable delay" (R. 182). The 
trial court applied the exception too broadly when it found that 
these circumstances warranted setting aside the statutory bar. 
Neither section 78-35a-107 nor any prior appellate opinion 
specifically defines what circumstances trigger the "interests-
of-justice" exception to filing a timely petition. Nevertheless, 
6The State filed no cross-appeal in this case. 
Nevertheless, the Court may affirm on this basis. "If appellees 
or respondents merely desire the affirmance of the lower court's 
judgment, they need not, and should not, cross appeal or cross 
petition." South, 924 P.2d at 355. 
9 
the trial court applied the exception too broadly because the 
trial court's interpretation allows the exception to swallow the 
rule. See In Re E.H.. 880 P.2d 11, 13 (Utah App.) ("Utah courts 
have a duty to interpret statutes so that they will not be 
rendered meaningless"), cert denied, 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994). 
The trial court incorrectly relied on petitioner's 
incarceration to excuse the untimely filing: nearly all persons 
who file post-conviction relief petitions do so while 
incarcerated. If incarceration always excuses an untimely 
filing, the statute would bar almost no untimely-filed petitions. 
The trial court's determination that petitioner's fifteen-
day tardiness was "not unreasonable," and, consequently 
excusable, similarly negates the statute's effect. The 
legislature has already determined that any delay beyond one-year 
is "unreasonable." Excusing a short additional delay, without 
more, vitiates the legislature's determination.. 
In effect, the trial court's broad interpretation made the 
"interests of justice" exception the rule and the statute's 
application the exception. Therefore, the trial court 
incorrectly applied the exception to excuse petitioner's untimely 
filing. Id. See also Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 252 
n.ll (Utah 1988) (courts have a fundamental duty to give effect, 
if possible, to every word of a statute). 
Prior appellate interpretations of identical language in 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, also support a much 
narrower construction of the interest-of-justice exception than 
10 
the trial court applied. Rule 51 prohibits a party from 
assigning error to a jury instruction unless that party 
contemporaneously objects to the instruction. Utah R. Civ. P. 
51. However, the rule permits an appellate court to excuse a 
partyfs failure to object if it is "in the interests of justice" 
to do so. Id. The party seeking appellate review under the 
"interests of justice" exception must show that "special 
circumstances" warrant such review. Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991)(quoting Hansen v. Stewart, 
761 P.2d 14,17 (Utah 1988)); see also In re Estate of Russell, 
852 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1993). 
The appellate courts have imposed this narrow construction 
on the "interests of justice" exception to prevent the exception 
from swallowing the rule. Therefore, "special circumstances" 
triggering the exception do not include mere procedural defaults 
such as failing to take an opportunity to preserve an objection, 
Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 364 
(Utah App. 1991); a mere failure to preserve a narrow, technical 
objection, Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d at 799; or the 
absence of a court reporter when the party made the objection 
where the party had a later opportunity to get the objection on 
the record, King v. Feredav. 739 P.2d 618, 621-22 (Utah 1987). 
The tenth circuit has applied an interests of justice 
exception in the context of untimely appeals. See, e.g., Seniuro 
v. Murray, 943 F.2d 36, 37 (10th Cir. 1991). However, that 
exception only applies in the "carefully limited circumstances" 
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where an appellant detrimentally relies on a court action leading 
the appellant to believe that he had filed a timely notice of 
appeal. Id. Senjuro was incarcerated at the time he filed his 
notice of appeal. Id. He mailed the notice outside of the 
thirty-day period for filing the notice and asked for no 
extension. Id. Senjuro argued that the court should hear his 
appeal because he did not receive timely notice of the entry of 
judgment. Id. 
Despite his incarceration, the tenth circuit held that 
untimely notice of the entry of judgment does not excuse a late 
appeal. Id. The tenth circuit denied relief because the record 
showed that the district court made no statements and took no 
actions that would have led Senjuro to believe that he had filed 
a timely notice of appeal. Id. at 37-38. Therefore, Senjuro1s 
case did not fall within the limited circumstances that justified 
excusing an untimely filing. Id. at 38. 
The Utah courts of applied a similar limitation to the 
"interests of justice" exception to the rule that equitable 
estoppel cannot apply to a government agency. In this context, 
the exception to the broad proscription only applies in ""unusual 
circumstances "'where it is plain that the interests of justice 
so require."1" Anderson v. Public Service Commission, 83 9 P.2d 
822, 827 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted). In Anderson, the 
supreme court noted that the exception only applied when a party 
had relied on a very specific written representation from the 
agency. Id. It refused to apply the exception in Anderson's 
12 
case because no such specific representation existed. Id. at 
827-28. Thus, like the federal rule, the exception only applies 
when the tribunal causes a party's detrimental reliance. 
All of these cases apply the interests of justice exceptions 
only in special or unusual circumstances. This court should also 
narrowly construe the "interests of justice" exception in the 
post-conviction relief statute of limitations. A narrow 
construction promotes the statute's purpose to encourage 
petitioner's to pursue meritorious claims diligently. In that 
context, the exception should only apply when some impediment 
beyond the petitioner's control affects his ability to diligently 
pursue his claims.7 Cf. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 
1359-60 (Utah App. 1993) (one appellant's late filing excused due 
to his transfer to a rural county jail and resulting inability to 
meet with attorneys; other appellant's late filing excused due to 
withdrawal of two appellate attorneys, difficulty contacting new 
attorneys, and misplacement of trial transcript excused untimely 
filing) cert, denied. 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994). Anything less 
defeats the statute's purpose by allowing untimely petitions 
regardless of the petitioner's diligence. 
A narrow construction of the "interests of justice" language 
precludes excusing petitioner's late filing. Petitioner alleged 
no facts demonstrating that anything beyond his control impeded 
7The statute already contains a tolling provision for newly 
discovered evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(e) (1996). The 
statute then allows a full year to file a petition after 
discovery of the facts on which the petition is based. 
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his ability to file his petition timely. For example, petitioner 
made no allegations that the State denied him access to legal 
materials, that repeated transfers made it impossible for him to 
prepare the petition or to mail it, or that a court or anyone 
else led him to believe that his petition would be timely.8 
The facts on which the trial court relied also do not 
demonstrate "special circumstances." Petitioner argued only that 
his incarceration, by itself, excused the late filing (R. 65-72). 
As already argued, the there is nothing special about 
petitioner's circumstance of incarceration: most post-conviction 
petitioners find themselves in the same circumstances. 
Similarly, petitioner's fifteen-day delay, while not lengthy, 
amounts to nothing more than a procedural default similar to that 
rejected as an excuse for failing to object to a jury 
instruction. 
Finally, the petitioner's allegations and the case's 
procedural history establish the true reason for petitioner's 
delay: petitioner filed his petition only when he became 
dissatisfied with the bargain he struck and his resulting 
incarceration term. Petitioner alleged in his petition that, 
during the 1993 plea negotiations, his counsel contacted Fred 
Trujillo at the Board of Pardons about the anticipated length of 
any additional incarceration (R. 20). Mr. Trujillo purportedly 
8To the extent that the trial court's finding that 
petitioner had no constructive notice of the statute suggests a 
denial of access to legal materials, that finding is clearly 
erroneous. Petitioner presented no evidence and did not allege 
anything to support such a conclusion. 
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opined that the Board would most likely release petitioner 
shortly after his return to prison due to his having already 
served six years and eleven months (R. 20-21). 
Petitioner then pleaded guilty and appealed neither the 
pleas nor the sentence, even though he bases the legal claims in 
his petition on facts apparent at the time he entered his guilty 
pleas. To the contrary, petitioner waited to file his petition 
until after his February 1997 Board hearing resulted in a 2004 
rehearing date (R. 17, 21). 
Petitioner's own allegations and the procedural history of 
this case establish that petitioner filed his petition late only 
because he became dissatisfied with the bargain he had struck. 
Indeed, petitioner was apparently satisfied with the plea bargain 
until he discovered that he would remain incarcerated longer than 
he anticipated. Buyer's remorse in the plea process does not 
trigger the "interests of justice" exception to excuse his 
untimely filing. To the contrary, this case presents exactly the 
situation that the legislature sought to avoid when it passed the 
limitations period 
In sum, the trial court improperly excused petitioner's 
untimely filing. Nevertheless, this Court may affirm the 
ultimate dismissal of the petition because, when correctly 
interpreted, the statute of limitations barred the petition. 
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POINT II 
PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA TO EVIDENCE TAMPERING 
EFFECTIVELY WAIVED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS' DEFENSE 
TO THAT CHARGE; ALTERNATIVELY, THE STATUTE DID NOT BAR 
THE GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE AMENDING THE ORIGINAL 
INFORMATION TO INCLUDE THE EVIDENCE TAMPERING CHARGE 
RELATED BACK TO THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL, TIMELY-
FILED INFORMATION9 
Petitioner challenges his plea to evidence-tampering, 
contending that the statute of limitations barred that plea, and 
that he could not waive the statutory bar because it is 
jurisdictional. Appellantfs Brief at 10-11.10 The trial court 
correctly ruled that petitioner waived his statute of limitations 
defense when he pleaded guilty to evidence tampering (R. 183). 
However, regardless of whether petitioner could waive the 
statute of limitations, the statute did not bar petitioner's 
guilty plea to evidence tampering because amending the 
information to include that charge related back to the original 
information's timely filing. 
Prior to retrial on aggravated murder, the State offered to 
allow petitioner to plead guilty to two second degree felonies: 
manslaughter and perjury (R. 1). Petitioner contended below 
that, two days prior to the plea, his counsel discovered that the 
criminal statute of limitations precluded his guilty plea to 
perjury (R. 224). According to petitioner, the prosecutor and 
his attorneys then opted for a guilty plea to evidence tampering 
9This point responds to Point I in Appellant's Brief. 
10The State concedes that the amended information charging 
evidence tampering was filed more than four years after the 
events on which the charge was based. 
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in lieu of perjury (R. 236). Petitioner agreed to the change and 
pleaded to manslaughter and evidence tampering in order to avoid 
retrial on aggravated murder (Crim. R. 2127-35).u Petitioner 
did not appeal his plea. 
In his petition, petitioner contends that the statute of 
limitations had run on the evidence tampering charge, making it 
"illegal" to prosecute (R. 24). Petitioner concludes that the 
trial court violated his rights by allowing the evidence 
tampering charge even though the statute had run (R. 25). 
At the motion hearing, the State contended that the criminal 
statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, and that petitioner 
waived its protections when he pleaded guilty (R. 232).12 The 
trial court ruled that petitioner had waived the defense (R. 
183) . 
A. This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that 
petitioner waived the statute of limitations when he 
pleaded guilty. 
Petitioner contends that the criminal statute of limitations 
is jurisdictional; therefore, the trial court incorrectly held 
nThe existing record does not establish why the parties 
believed that the statute of limitations would not bar the 
evidence-tampering plea. The statute's plain language clearly 
applied to that crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (1995). 
However, the argument in subsection B may provide an 
explanation: amendment to include a crime arising out of the same 
events as the crime originally charged would avoid the statutory 
bar because the amendment would relate back to the date of the 
timely-filed original information. 
12The State had to make this argument without the benefit of 
briefing because the State based its motion to dismiss solely on 
petitioner's untimely filing of his petition. 
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that he had waived that defense. This Court should hold that a 
criminal defendant may waive the statute's protections in the 
context of a plea agreement. 
No Utah case has directly ruled on this issue.13 As this 
Court has acknowledged in the past and as petitioner acknowledges 
in his brief, other states have split on the question. 
Appellant's Brief at 13; State v Moore, 802 P.2d at 737 n.9. See 
generally Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Waivability of Bar of 
Limitations Against Criminal Prosecutions, 78 A.L.R. 4th 693 
13The State recognizes that language in other cases suggests 
that the criminal statute of limitations is jurisdictional. In 
State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1989), this Court held 
that the State bore the burden of proving that it had commenced 
the prosecution within the statutory period. Id. at 196. The 
Court reached this conclusion in reliance on a California case 
holding that the criminal statute of limitations is 
jurisdictional. Id. 
In State v Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990), this Court 
acknowledged that Moore had not preserved his appellate statute-
of-limitations argument, and that his failure would normally 
preclude appellate review. Id. at 737 n.9. The Court further 
acknowledged that no Utah case had considered whether the statute 
was jurisdictional, that other jurisdictions had split on the 
issue, and that one jurisdiction had held that a defendant had to 
raise the statute in the trial court even if it was 
jurisdictional. Id. However, the Court never resolved the issue 
because the State conceded at oral argument that the statute was 
jurisdictional and not waivable. Id. For the reasons argued in 
the text, the State improvidently made that concession. 
Neither Pierce nor Moore considered the effect of a guilty 
plea on the statute of limitations defense. 
Finally, the State acknowledges that the statute's mandatory 
language arguably supports concluding that the statute is 
jurisdictional. See, e.g., State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 582-84 
(Utah App. 1992) (statutory prescription of time for filing a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is jurisdictional due to its 
unconditional language). 
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(1990 and Supp. 1997).14 However, the majority of jurisdictions 
favor allowing a defendant to waive the statutory bar. Id. at 
698-700 & Supp. 18-19.15 
Moreover, the statute's purpose and Utah cases allowing 
substantial latitude in making enforceable plea agreements 
support concluding that a defendant may waive the statute in the 
context of a plea agreement. A statute of limitations promotes 
finality and protects a defendant from the burden of defending 
against stale claims. Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 
1087, 1091 (Utah 1989) . However, a criminal defendant may 
conclude that the advantages to pleading to a lesser crime that 
the statute would otherwise bar outweigh the protections the 
statute affords. Because the statute protects the defendant's 
interests, the defendant ought to be able to waive its 
protections, especially when it provides the defendant with an 
14Courts that recognize the waivability of a criminal 
statute of limitations have also recognized varying circumstances 
under which the defendant can waive the statute. Those 
circumstances range from permitting the waiver only when the 
defendant expressly waives the statute on the record to 
recognizing a waiver when the defendant merely fails to raise the 
statute as a defense. Id. at 698-702. 
15Petitioner correctly cites United States v. Cooper, 956 
F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 1992) for the proposition that the tenth 
circuit considers the federal statute of limitations 
jurisdictional. However, the tenth circuit did not find that the 
statute equated to subject matter jurisdiction and recognized 
that a criminal defendant may agree not to assert it as part of a 
plea bargain. Id. at 962-63. Therefore, the case does not stand 
for the proposition that a defendant may never plead guilty to a 
charge on which the statute has already run. 
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alternative and frequently more valuable benefit.16 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized a 
defendant's ability to plead guilty to crimes that the defendant 
could not be found factually guilty of committing. Hurst v. 
Cook, 777 p.2d 1029, 1038 (Utah 1989). If a defendant may plead 
guilty to a crime that he could not have committed, he should 
also have the ability to waive the statute of limitations in 
order to plead guilty to a crime that he did commit. 
Moreover, a defendant may waive his constitutional right to 
a speedy trial. That right protects interests similar to those 
protected by the statute of limitations: to insulate a criminal 
defendant from have to defend against stale claims. Precluding a 
defendant from waiving the statute of limitations would elevate 
the statutory prescription over important constitutional rights. 
At least one other jurisdiction has considered these 
principles in concluding that a defendant may waive the statutory 
bar to prosecution. In Conerly v. State, 607 So.2d 1153 (Miss 
1992), the Mississippi Supreme Court considered a procedural 
situation indistinguishable from the one in this case. A jury 
convicted Conerly of armed robbery, a crime that carried a 
minimum mandatory ten-year sentence. Id. at 1154. The 
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed. Id. Prior to retrial, 
16The criminal statute of limitations is also 
distinguishable from the mandatory time limits considered in 
Price and the cases cited in Price. Those cases found systemic 
limitations periods jurisdictional; none of those cases dealt 
with periods designed to protect a defendant. State v. Price, 
837 P.2d at 582-84. 
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Conerly!s attorney negotiated a plea bargain that would allow 
Conerly to plead guilty to simple robbery and assault; the 
bargain eliminated the minimum mandatory sentence. Id. The 
prosecutor executed a new information charging Conerly with 
simple robbery and assault, and Conerly pleaded guilty to those 
charges. Id. at 1155. The trial court sentenced Conerly to 
consecutive terms on the two charges. Id. Like petitioner, 
Conerly collaterally attacked the new charge (assault), 
contending that the statue of limitations barred that charge. 
Id. 
The Mississippi court rejected Conerlyfs argument and held 
that his voluntary guilty plea to the assault charge waived the 
statute of limitations. The court reasoned: 
Generally speaking . . . the purpose of the 
criminal statute of limitations, much like the purpose 
behind the right to a speedy trial, is to avoid the 
bringing of stale criminal charges. . . . [T]his 
purpose is related to determining fairly the factual 
guilt of a defendant and not with the ability of the 
State to bring charges against the defendant. 
Accordingly, it is said that a voluntary and counseled 
guilty plea waives one's right to assert a statute of 
limitation defense. 
Id. at 1156-57 (citations omitted). 
Petitioner could and did validly waive the statute of 
limitations defense when he pleaded guilty to evidence tampering. 
One jury had already convicted petitioner of aggravated murder, 
and the trial court had sentenced him to life in prison (R. 18). 
Although the Utah Supreme Court reversed that conviction, 
petitioner faced retrial for aggravated murder and, if convicted, 
a life sentence. His trial counsel succeeded in securing a deal 
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for petitioner that reduced his capital felony to two second-
degree felonies, reducing his maximum possible incarceration from 
life to thirty years (Crim. R. 2127-38). When petitioner pleaded 
guilty to evidence tampering, he waived his statute of 
limitations defense in order to obtain the benefit of the plea 
bargain. 
Petitioner contends that even jurisdictions permitting a 
defendant to waive the statute require a knowing and voluntary 
waiver, and that he could not knowingly waive the statute because 
his attorney did not inform him that it applied to evidence 
tampering. Appellantfs Brief at 13.17 Although the existing 
record does not definitively establish whether petitioner knew 
the statute of limitations also applied to evidence tampering, 
this Court should affirm petitioner's waiver based on what the 
record does establish. 
Petitioner acknowledged to the trial court that the State 
wanted guilty pleas to two second-degree felonies in exchange for 
giving up its right to prosecute petitioner for a capital felony 
(R. 236). Regardless of whether petitioner knew that the statute 
applied to evidence tampering, the record shows that petitioner 
17To the extent petitioner suggests that all jurisdictions 
permitting a waiver also impose this requirement, he misstates 
the law. As noted above, some jurisdictions recognize that a 
defendant may waive the statute merely by not raising it as a 
defense. See Annotation at 698-700 & Supp. 18-19. Moreover, the 
Mississippi Court recognized that Conerly's knowing and voluntary 
guilty plea waived the statute even though the record did not 
establish whether Conerly knew that the statute had run on the 
assault charge. Conerly v. State, 607 So.2d at 1158 (Sullivan, 
J. dissenting). 
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knew that he had to plead guilty to two second degree felonies in 
order to avoid the possibility of reprosecution for a capital 
felony. 
For the reasons argued, the Court should affirm the trial 
court's conclusion that petitioner's knowing and voluntary plea 
waived any defense to the evidence tampering charge, including 
any claim that the statute of limitations barred that charge. 
B. Alternatively, the statute of limitations did not bar 
petitioner's plea to evidence tampering because the 
amendment to include that charge related back to the 
original, timely filed information. 
Even if petitioner could not waive the statute of 
limitations, the statute of limitations did not bar his plea to 
evidence tampering because the charge related back to the 
original, timely-filed petition.18 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure permit amending an 
information at any time prior to a verdict. Utah R. Crim. P. 
4(d).19 No rule of criminal procedure specifically delineates 
when an amendment to an information relates back to the filing of 
the original information. However, the rules of civil procedure 
Indeed, this Court may affirm on this basis without even 
considering whether petitioner could waive the statutory bar. 
19The rule permits the amendment "if no additional or 
different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced." Id. In this case, the amendment 
added the evidence-tampering charge. However, because petitioner 
necessarily agreed to the amendment as part of the plea bargain 
(Crim. P. 2127), he waived any claim that adding the charge 
violated the rule. Cf. Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 215-16 
(Utah 1993) (failure to object to an amendment or to raise its 
unlawfulness precludes appellate review in a petition for 
extraordinary relief), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1050 (1994). 
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govern in criminal actions "where there is no other applicable 
statute or rule" as long as applying the civil rule does not 
conflict with any "constitutional requirement." Utah R. Civ. P. 
81(e) . 
Under the rules of civil procedure, an amendment to a civil 
pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading 
"[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading . . . ." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 15(c). If a new claim relates back to the date of the 
original pleading, a party may include it even when the statute 
of limitations has otherwise run on that claim. Rinawood v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah App.)(citing 
Myers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879 (Utah 1981)), cert. 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
The evidence-tampering charge arose out of the same 
occurrences that generated the original aggravated murder charge. 
The original information charged petitioner with the aggravated 
murder of his son (R. 1A). At the time he murdered his son, 
petitioner wrapped the infant's body in a tarp weighted down with 
rocks and threw the body into the Bear River to conceal it (R. 4, 
Crim. R. 2-5, 11-13, 2125) . These facts formed the basis for the 
evidence tampering charge (Crim. R. 2125). Concealing his baby's 
body by discarding it in the river formed an integral part of the 
originally charged homicide. Therefore, the evidence tampering 
arose out of the same transaction or occurrence which gave rise 
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to the aggravated murder charges. 
Sound policy also supports applying the relation-back 
doctrine to criminal cases, especially in the plea context. A 
statute of limitations promotes finality and protects litigants 
from the burden of defending against stale claims. Horton v. 
Goldminerfs Daughter. 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989). The 
relation-back rule does nothing to defeat this purpose: because 
the added claims must arise out of the same set of occurrences as 
the original claims, the party already has notice of the evidence 
against which it must defend. The same is true in criminal 
cases. 
In this case, petitioner clearly had notice of the facts 
supporting the subsequently added evidence-tampering charge at 
the time the State originally charged him with aggravated murder: 
the affidavits in support of search and arrest warrants, dated 
contemporaneously with the original information, both detailed 
those facts (Crim. R. 2-5, 8-17) . The affidavits are attached as 
addenda H and I respectively. Furthermore, petitioner agreed to 
those facts in support of his plea; therefore, he faced no risk 
of having to defend against a claim about which he had no timely 
notice. 
C. Petitioner is not entitled to have his evidence 
tampering sentence vacated while leaving the remainder 
of the plea agreement in tact. 
Petitioner contends that the statutory bar should absolve 
him from having to serve the consecutive one-to-fifteen-year 
sentence for the evidence tampering charge. Appellant's Brief at 
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10. Even if this Court agrees with petitioner's contention that 
the statute of limitations precluded his guilty plea to evidence 
tampering, he has requested a remedy to which he is not entitled. 
The evidence tampering plea and resulting sentence arose 
from a plea bargain. That bargain required petitioner to plead 
guilty to manslaughter and evidence tampering in exchange for the 
Statef s agreement not to try him for aggravated murder a second 
time. If petitioner succeeds on his substantive challenge to the 
evidence-tampering plea, the appropriate remedy would be to 
return the parties to their pre-plea positions; not to void only 
one part of the agreement to make it even more beneficial to 
petitioner. See Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979) 
(dicta) (if defendant is allowed to withdraw his plea, fairness 
requires "that the case should revert to its status on the 
original charge as it was before the agreement to enter his plea 
of guilty"); State v. Gentry. 797 P.2d 456, 459 n.4 (Utah App. 
1990) (dicta) (acknowledging return to pre-agreement positions is 
the usual remedy, but explaining why it could not be applied in 
that case). 
In sum, even if this Court concludes that petitioner could 
not waive the statute of limitations, the statute did not bar 
petitioner's guilty plea to evidence tampering because the 
amended information related back to the timely filed original 
information. 
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POINT III 
BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT PRECLUDE 
PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA TO EVIDENCE TAMPERING, TRIAL 
COUNSEL DID NOT PERFORM DEFICIENTLY BY ALLOWING HIM TO 
PLEAD GUILTY TO THAT CHARGE20 
Petitioner next contends that his counsel performed 
deficiently by not raising the statutory bar to the evidence 
tampering charge. Appellant's Brief at 14. In effect, 
petitioner argues that the statute of limitations rendered his 
plea to evidence tampering illegal; therefore, counsel performed 
deficiently by allowing him to enter that plea.21 
In order to succeed on this claim, petitioner must establish 
two elements. First, he must identify the specific acts or 
20This argument responds to Point II in petitioner's brief. 
21Petitioner does not clearly state his argument either 
below or in his brief. However, his other arguments and the 
relief he seeks establish that he bases his argument on the 
contention that counsel performed deficiently by allowing him to 
enter a plea that the law abolutely precluded him from entering. 
Petitioner contends that the statute of limitations issue turns 
on whether the statute is jurisdictional, and that counsel's 
conduct prejudiced him because it permitted an additional second-
degree felony conviction and asks this Court to vacate the 
evidence tampering plea. Appellant's Brief at 10-12, 14. 
Similarly, petitioner has not asked for an evidentiary hearing to 
determine what counsel advised him. Therefore, petitioner 
contends only that counsel erroneously allowed him to plead to a 
charge that the law precluded him from pleading to. 
Moreover, petitioner's pleadings below support this 
characterization of his argument. Petitioner contended that the 
statute of limitations had run on the evidence-tampering charge, 
making it "illegal to prosecute" (R. 22). Similarly, petitioner 
defended against the State's motion to dismiss his petition as 
untimely by contending that the post-conviction relief statute of 
limitations did not apply because he was challenging an illegal 
sentence (R. 66). Again, the arguments establish that petitioner 
contended that the statute precluded his plea to evidence 
tampering as a matter of law. 
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omissions he claims fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 
690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994) . This element requires petitioner to 
overcome a strong presumption that counsel rendered 
constitutionally sufficient assistance. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 690; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 522. 
Petitioner's claim can succeed only if this Court can surmise no 
conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy from trial counsel's 
actions. State v. Perrv, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995) 
(""[T]his court will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate 
strategic choices, however, flawed those choice might appear in 
retrospect.'"). 
Second, petitioner must establish prejudice from the alleged 
deficient performance. In the guilty plea context, petitioner 
must establish that, but for counsel's error, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 
Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d at 525. In other words, petitioner 
must establish that the alleged deficient performance affected 
the outcome of the plea process. Id. 
As already established in Point II, the factual predicate 
for petitioner's ineffectiveness claim fails: the statute of 
limitations did not legally bar petitioner's plea to evidence 
tampering. Petitioner has not overcome the strong presumption 
that counsel performed adequately by permitting him to plead 
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guilty to that crime. 
Petitioner's prejudice argument similarly fails. He 
contends that he would not have an additional second-degree 
felony conviction if counsel had pointed out its illegality. 
However, because it was not illegal, the factual predicate for 
his prejudice claim also fails. Similarly, petitioner has not 
even argued let alone established that he would gone to trial on 
the aggravated murder charge rather than accept the plea offer, 
or that he stood a reasonable chance of success at trial. See, 
e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 59 (1985). Therefore, 
he has failed as a matter of law to establish that counsel's 
conduct undermines confidence in the outcome, and that failure 
independently defeats his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. 
POINT IV 
PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO THE $160,000 AWARDED TO CACHE 
COUNTY IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED23 
Petitioner challenges the $160,000 awarded to Cache County. 
Although the sentencing court awarded this amount as restitution, 
the parties have effectively agreed that it is more properly 
treated as an award under Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2 (1995), which 
permits a trial court to "require a convicted defendant to make 
restitution and pay costs," including "attorney fees of counsel 
22Moreover, counsel managed to insulate petitioner against 
exposure to either a capital felony with a possible life sentence 
or even a first degree felony with a five-to-life sentence and 
secure for him a sentence that could last, at most, thirty years. 
23This argument responds to Point III in petitioner s brief. 
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assigned to represent the defendant." Id. § 77-32a-2. 
Petitioner attacks the internal consistency and the 
constitutionality of the statute, contends the amount is 
excessive, and claims that the trial court erroneously imposed it 
without considering his financial resources. Appellantfs Brief 
at 17.24 However, petitioner never challenged this award at the 
24Although the State contends that petitioner is 
procedurally barred from challenging the award, petitioner's 
challenges to the statute fail as a matter of law. Section 77-
32a-2 permits a court to order a convicted defendant to reimburse 
the county for the amounted expended to provide him with an 
attorney. 
Petitioner claims section 77-32a-2 is internally 
inconsistent and vague because the statute provides for recovery 
of attorney's fees but not for expenses "inherent in providing a 
constitutionally guaranteed trial." Appellant's Brief at 17. 
Petitioner argues that the cost of State appointed legal 
representation is "inherent in providing a constitutionally 
guaranteed trial." Thus, the statute both allows and prohibits 
the State from recovering the costs of an indigent's defense. 
Although, no Utah case interprets the "costs inherent in 
providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial" provision, Oregon 
cases interpreting a statute after which Utah patterned section 
77-32a-2 provide insight into the phrase's meaning. State v. 
Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162, 163-64 (Utah 1992) (borrowing Oregon case 
law to determine whether the State can recover the costs of a 
code R examination from a rapist under section 77-32a-2). Oregon 
courts consistently interpret their statute to allow the State or 
a political subdivision to recover attorney's fees from indigent 
defendants. State v. Mitchell, 617 P.2d 298, 301-02 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1980); State v. Fuller, 504 p.2d 1393, 1396 (Or. Ct. App. 
1973), aff'd 417 U.S. 40 (1974). The statute also permits 
recovery for other expenses specially incurred in prosecuting a 
defendant. York v. Oregon State Correctional Inst., 651 P.2d 
1376, 1378 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)(State can recover costs incurred 
in returning a prisoner who absconded to Florida while on 
temporary prison leave); State v. Armstrong, 605 P.2d 736, 738 
(Or. Ct. App. 1980)(holding recoverable costs incurred 
transporting defendant back to Oregon after an extradition 
waiver); State v. Hastings, 544 P.2d 590, 590 (Or. Ct. App. 
1976)(witness fees recoverable under statute). Expenses not 
recoverable include prosecutor's salaries, payments to jurors, 
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time the trial court imposed it, did not appeal the award, and 
has alleged no unusual circumstances justifying his procedural 
default; therefore, the claim is procedurally barred. 
"Habeas Corpus proceedings may be used to attack a judgment 
or conviction in the event of an obvious injustice or a 
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right in 
the trial of a matter but it may not be used as a substitute for 
regular appellate review." Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 804 
(Utah 1988)(citations omitted). "It is therefore well settled in 
this state that allegations of error that could have been but 
were not raised on appeal from a criminal conviction cannot be 
raised by habeas corpus or post conviction review, except in 
unusual circumstances." Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 
(Utah 1983) . 
Unusual circumstances excusing a procedural default include 
the discovery of previously undiscoverable evidence or 
ineffective assistance of defense counsel. Bundy v. Deland, 763 
police officer's salaries, costs of investigation, and 
operational overhead because those expenses are inherent in 
providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial. State v. Heston, 
704 P.2d 541, 543 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (comparing recoverable 
expenses with those that are not); State v. Washburn. 616 P.2d 
554, 555 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (sheriff's overtime pay not 
recoverable); Hastings, 544 P.2d at 590 (juror's fees not 
recoverable). 
Case also directly contradicts petitioner's constitutional 
argument. The United States Supreme Court has found that 
Oregon's similar cost recovery scheme does not interfere with a 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Fuller v. Oregon. 
417 U.S. 40, 54, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 2125 (1974). 
Therefore petitioner's challenges to the statute fail as a 
matter of law. 
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P.2d at 804; Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343-44 (Utah 1980). 
Petitioner has never argued, let alone established, any unusual 
circumstances justifying the procedural default in this case. 
If, as petitioner alleges, the trial court neglected to consider 
his financial resources before ordering petitioner to reimburse 
the county, that fact was immediately obvious to petitioner. 
Petitioner knew that he was indigent and his long term financial 
outlook at the time he was sentenced. If the trial court 
erroneously failed to consider those facts, petitioner should 
have brought that error to the sentencing judge's attention and 
taken a direct appeal if denied relief. Petitioner does not 
allege that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during 
the sentencing procedure, nor does he put forth any unusual 
circumstances which prevented the discovery of the alleged error 
which occurred almost three years prior to the time that he filed 
his petition (R. 6-7). In short, he offers nothing to excuse his 
procedural default, and that failure requires applying the 
procedural bar.25 
25If this Court does not accept the procedural bar argument, 
then the appropriate remedy would be to remand this case for an 
evidentiary hearing on this issue. Because the trial court 
granted the State's motion to dismiss, it held no such hearing, 
and the existing record presents no evidence to establish whether 
the trial court considered petitioner's financial resources. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the State asks the Court to affirm 
the trial court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
This case presents two issues of first impression. First, 
it asks this Court to interpret the "interests of justice" 
exception to the statute of limitations governing petitions for 
post-conviction relief. Second, it presents an issue of whether 
the Utah criminal statute of limitations may be waived in the 
context of a plea agreement. Therefore, the State requests oral 
argument in this case. To the extent that the Court rules on the 
merits of either or both of these issues, the State also requests 
a published opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /? — day of /l/[n A , 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
THOMAS B. BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
33 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, by first class U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to 
MARK T. ETHINGTON, DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C, 45 East Vine 
Street, Murray, Utah, 81407, this £• -—'day of Novomber, 199/7. 
Q-^-^^r -J I x~uj-%«->fafi-x. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-1-302. Time limitations for prosecution of offenses -
Commencement of prosecution. 
Statute text 
(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for: 
(a) a felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced within four 
years after it is committed; 
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent homicide shall be 
commenced within two years after it is committed; and 
(c) any infraction shall be commenced within one year after it is 
committed. 
(2) A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and filing of an 
indictment by a grand jury or upon the filing of a complaint or 
information. 
History 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-302, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 
76-1-302; 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 2, § 2; 1990, ch. 5, § 1. 
77-32a-2. Costs - What constitute. 
Statute text 
Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the 
state or any political subdivision in investigating, searching 
for, apprehending, and prosecuting the defendant, including 
attorney fees of counsel assigned to represent the defendant 
pursuant to Section 77-32-2, interpreter fees and investigators' 
fees. Costs cannot include expenses inherent in providing a 
constitutionally guaranteed trial or expenditures in connection 
with the maintenance and operation of government agencies that 
must be made by the public irrespective of specific violations of 
law. Costs cannot include attorneys1 fees for prosecuting 
attorneys. 
History 
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-2, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 15, § 2; 
1993, ch. 238, § 1; 1997, ch. 215, § 13. 
78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for post-conviction relief. 
Statute text 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is 
filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on 
the latest of the following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final 
judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has 
jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in 
the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no 
petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of 
certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition for 
certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on 
which the petition is based. 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a 
court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the time 
limitations. 
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations 
period established in this section. 
History 
History: C. 1953, 78-12-31.1, enacted by L. 1995, ch. 82, § 1; 
renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 7. 
Annotations 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1995, ch. 82, § 1 repeals former 
§ 78-12-31.1, as enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 133, § 1, setting a 
three-month time limit on the right to petition for a habeas 
corpus writ, and enacts the present section, effective May 1, 
1995. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, 
renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 78-12-31.1; 
added Subsection (4), redesignating former Subsection (4) as (3); 
deleted former Subsections (3) and (5) concerning applicability 
to time limitations and motions to correct a sentence; in 
Subsections (1) and (2) deleted "pursuant to Rule 65B(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure" after "entitled to relief"; and in 
Subsection (2) deleted "in a petition for post-conviction relief" 
after "cause of action." 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, 
DOB: 2-27-52 
Defendant. 
8^K66t>kn 
INFORMATION 
H4-W 
The undersigned Craig Andrews, under oath states on information 
and belief that the above named defendant(s) committed the crime 
of: 
CRIME: Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree 
IN VIOLATION OF: Section 76-5-202(1)(h) U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 
CLASSIFICATION: Capital Felony 
AT: Cache County, State of Utah 
ON OR ABOUT: August 26, 1986 
The acts of the defendant(s) constituting the crime(s) were: 
That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, did 
intentionally or knowingly cause the death of another, to wit: 
Steven Roy James, the said Defendant having been previously 
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to 
a person. 
The information is based on evidence obtained from the following 
witnesses: Craig Andrews 
COMPLAINANT 
Authorized for presentment 
and filing: 
Subscribed and sworn to before 
me this 9 ? day oj\ 
10-23-86 Warrant Issued 
l / V 
ADDENDUM C 
JAMES C. JENKINS #1658 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
110 North 100 West 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone (801) 752-8920 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, ] 
DOB: 02-17-52 
Defendant. 
i PLEA AGREEMENT 
| District No. 891900667 
The Defendant, STEVEN RAY JAMES, by and through his legal 
counsel, Barbara King Lachmar and Arden W. Lauritzen, has entered 
into plea negotiations with the Office of the Cache County Attorney 
which is prosecuting this case on behalf of the State of Utah. 
Based on those negotiations, the parties have agreed as follows: 
1. The Defendant was originally charged with the following: 
COUNT OFFENSE DEGREE DATE OF OFFENSE 
1 Criminal Homicide Capitol 08-26-86 
2. The Defendant shall enter pleas of guilty to the charges 
specified in the Amended Information: Count 1, Manslaughter; and 
Count 2, Tampering with Evidence. 
3. The Defendant shall make full restitution in an amount to 
be determined by the Court. 
1 
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4. Defendant has, with the advice and assistance of his legal 
counsel, read and executed this plea agreement and the accompanying 
statement of Defendant and has done so willingly, voluntarily, and 
without undue influence. 
5. Defendant shall file no motion for reduction or charges or 
sentencing under the provisions of S76-3-402, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended, and hereby acknowledges that he is not eligible 
for such relief. 
6. Defendant waives his right to appeal. 
7. A current presentence investigation report shall be 
prepared by Adult Probation and Parole and submitted to the Court 
prior to sentencing. 
8. The Defendant Shall comply with the following three-phase 
scheduling: 
A. The making of his disclosure statement in open 
court. 
B. Entry of plea. 
C. Sentencing. 
9. The Defendant shall waive his right to a preliminary 
hearing on Count 2, Tampering with Evidence. 
9^ The State of Utah, through the Office of the Cache County 
Attorney, has made no promises or commitments as to the sentence 
which the Court may impose in this matter nor to make any 
recommendations favorable to the Defendant for sentencing. The 
State reserves its right to present any arguments or 
recommendations it deems appropriate in the respect to sentencing. 
2 
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10. The Defendant acknowledges by signing this agreement and 
entering subsequent pleas of guilty as provided that the Defendant 
waives his right to trial and appeal and further that a motion to 
withdraw the guilty pleas must be filed with this Court within 
thirty (30) days of the entry of the pleas. 
11. There are no other agreements by and between the parties 
than as specified in this agreement unless acknowledged on the 
record in Court with all parties presents 
DATED this **— day of July, 1993. 
STATE OF UTAH 
/ JMESC 
§puty he County Attorney 
DEFENDANT DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
> & ^ A U A 
STEVEN RAY JAM BARBARA KING LACUNAR 
RNEY 
ZEN 
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ADDENDUM D 
JAMES C. JENKINS #1658 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
110 North 100 West 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone (801) 752-8920 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, ] 
DOB: 02-17-52 
Defendant. 
i STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
I District No. 891900667 
I, STEVEN RAY JAMES, the Defendant in this case, state as 
follows with respect to the entry by me of a guilty plea: 
1. I hereby confirm the entry of a plea of guilty to the 
following: 
COUNT OFFENSE CLASS 
1 Manslaughter (76-5-205) Second Degree 
Felony 
2 Tampering with Evidence Second Degree 
(76-8-510) Felony 
2. I have received and read a copy of the amended information 
filed against me in this case. 
3. I understand the nature and the elements of the offense or 
offenses to which I am pleading guilty. 
4. The elements of the offenses for the crimes to which I am 
pleading guilty: 
1 
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Count I: Manslaughter 
a. That I did recklessly cause the death of another. 
b. The crime was committed on or about August 26, 1986. 
c. The crime was committed in Cache County, Utah. 
d. My conduct, and the conduct of any other persons for 
which I am criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the 
crime charged is as follows: 
That I did recklessly cause the death of another, to wit: 
Steven Roy James, an infant, by shaking him too hard. 
e. I understand that the maximum punishment by statute 
for the offense would be not less than one and not more than 
fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Penitentiary and/or a fine not 
to exceed $10,000.00, plus a 25% surcharge. 
Count 2: Tampering with Evidence 
a. That I did, believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation was pending or about to be instituted, alter, 
destroy, conceal and/or remove something with a purpose to impair 
its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation, to-
wit: wrap the body of Steven Roy James after his death in a pad 
weighted by rocks and conceal the wrapped body by throwing it into 
the Bear River. 
b. The crime was committed on or about August 26, 1993. 
c. The crime was committed in Cache County, Utah. 
d. My conduct, and the conduct of any other persons for 
which I am criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the 
crime charged is as follows: 
2 
002131 
I knowingly and intentionally concealed the body of 
Steven Roy James after his death on August 26, 1986, by 
wrapping his body in a pad weighted by rocks and throwing 
it into the Bear River at the Marina in Cache County, 
Utah. 
e. I understand that the maximum punishment by statute 
for the offense would be not less than one and not more than 
fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Penitentiary and/or a fine not 
to exceed $10,000.00, plus a 25% surcharge. 
5. I am entering the guilty plea or pleas voluntarily and 
with the knowledge and understanding of the following: 
a. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that an attorney or attorneys will be appointed to 
represent me by the Court at no cost to me if I cannot afford one. 
b. I have not waived my right to legal counsel. The 
Court has appointed attorney Barbara King Lachmar and Arden W. 
Lauritzen to represented me at no cost to me. I have had the 
opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights, and the 
consequences of my guilty plea or pleas with my said attorneys 
prior to the execution and filing of this statement and the entry 
of my guilty plea or pleas before this Court. 
c. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury and 
that a unanimous verdict would be required for a conviction on each 
count before a jury. 
d. I know that if I elect to have a trial, I have the 
right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses who testify 
against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorneys. I also 
know that if I qualify as an indigent, I have the right to have my 
3 
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witnesses subpoenaed at State expense to testify in Court upon my 
behalf. 
e. I know I have the right to testify in my own behalf 
but that if I choose not to do so, I cannot be compelled to testify 
or give evidence against myself and further that no adverse 
inferences may or will be drawn against me if I elect to exercise 
my right not to testify. 
f. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against 
me, I may enter a plea of "not guilty" and the matter will be set 
for trial. The State of Utah will have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 
g. I know that under the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by a Judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the 
Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah and that if I could not afford to pay the costs 
for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State as required 
by law. 
h. I know that the maximum possible sentence may be 
imposed upon my plea of guilty and that such sentence may be for 
incarceration, fine, or a combination of both. I also know that in 
addition to the imposition of any fine, a 25% surcharge as required 
by §63-63a-1, Utah Code Annotated, will be imposed and that I may 
be ordered by the Court to make restitution to any victim or 
victims of my crimes, 
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i. I know that incarceration may be imposed by the 
Court to be served consecutive periods. I also know that if I am 
placed on probation, parole, or am awaiting sentencing on another 
offense in which I have been convicted or to which I have entered 
a plea of guilty, my plea in the present action may result in 
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
j. I know and understand that by entering a plea of 
guilty, I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights to file 
an appeal. 
k. I know that by entering a plea of guilty, I am 
admitting and do so admit, that I have committed the conduct 
alleged and I am guilty of the crimes for which my plea is entered. 
1. My plea or pleas of guilty are the result of a plea 
negotiation conducted between my attorneys, on my behalf, and the 
Cache County Attorney or his deputy. The terms of the plea 
negotiation, if any, have been set forth in the plea agreement 
filed with this Court together with this statement. 
m. I know that any plea negotiation is not binding on 
the Court nor any promise or concession of the prosecutor to 
recommend probation, suspended sentence, or reduced sentence. I 
also know that any opinions which they expressed to me as to what 
they believe the Court may do are not binding upon the Court. 
n. No threats, coercion, or unlawful or undue influence 
of any kind have been made to induce me to enter a plea or pleas of 
guilty and no promises other than as set forth in this statement or 
the attached plea agreement have been made to me. 
5 
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6. I have reviewed this statement with my attorneys and I 
understand its provisions. I know that I may change or delete 
anything contained in this statement prior to my signing and filing 
it with the Court. I do not wish to make any such changes or 
deletions. 
7. I have received legal advice and assistance from my 
attorneys and am satisfied with such advice and assistance. 
8. At the time of the execution of this agreement and the 
filing of the same with the Court, I was not and am not under the 
influence of any controlled substance, drugs, medication, or 
intoxicants. I am over 18 years of age and can read and understand 
the English language. 
9. I believe myself to be mentally capable of understanding 
these proceedings and the consequences of this statement and the 
entry of my plea of guilty. I am not undergoing any counseling or 
treatment, mentally or medically, which would impair or prevent me 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my pleas of 
guilty or executing and filing this statement. 
DATED this 3- day of CKA* * . 1993. 
D 
DEFENDANT 
JJk^ a-
STEVEN RAY JAMEST~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
We, the undersigned hereby certify that we are the attorneys 
of record in this matter for the Defendant, Steven Ray James; that 
we know he has read the foregoing statement or that we have read it 
to him and have discussed it with him; and that we believe that he 
fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent to execute it. 
To the best of our knowledge and belief, after an appropriate 
investigation, the elements of the crimes and the factual synopsis 
of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, 
along with the other representations and diHl^rations made by the 
Defendant in the foregoing statement, are accurate and true. 
DATED this <^*" day of thjUULAJ£^\wfo. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
002136 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the prosecuting attorney for the State of 
Utah in this case against the Defendant/ Steven Ray James, and have 
reviewed the foregoing statement of the Defendant and find that the 
declarations, including the elements of the offense of the charges 
and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitute the offenses are true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been made 
or offered to the defendant. The plea negotiations are fully set 
forth in the foregoing statement or the attached plea agreement or 
have been supplemented on record before this Court. There is 
reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of Defendant for the offenses for which the pleas of 
guilty are entered. Acceptance of these pleas of guilty would 
serve the public interest. 
ROSEQUTING/ A'SZTORNEY 
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ADDENDUM E 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE CC4JNTY^^gTSl^HT 
STATE OF UTAH Thira Judicial District 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, 
DOB: 02-17-52 
D e f e n d a n t . 
A M E N D E D 
INFORMATION 
District Ct. No. 891900667 
AUG 0 2 1993 
•"HTutv Clerk 
The STATE OF UTAH, upon evidence and belief, charges the 
above-named defendant with the commission of the following public 
offense: 
Manslaughter 
COUNT 1: 
CRIME: 
IN VIOLATION OF: Section 76-5-205 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
CLASSIFICATION: 2nd Degree Felony 
AT: Cache County, State of Utah 
ON OR ABOUT: August 26, 1986 
The acts of the defendant constituting the public offense were: 
That the Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, did 
recklessly cause the death of another, to-wit: Steven Roy 
James. 
COUNT 2 
CRIME: 
IN VIOLATION OF: 
CLASSIFICATION: 
AT: 
ON OR ABOUT; 
Tampering with Evidence 
Section 76-8-510 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
2nd Degree Felony 
Cache County, State of Utah 
August 26, 1986 
The acts of the defendant constituting the public offense were: 
That the Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, believing 
that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or 
about to be instituted, did alter, destroy, conceal and/or 
remove something with a purpose to impair its verity or 
availability in the proceeding or investigation, to-wit: wrap 
the body of Steven Roy James after his death in a tarp 
weighted by rocks and conceal it by throwing it into the Bear 
River at the Benson Marina in Cache County, Utah. 
A A >> * i 
This amended information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witness: Craig Andrews and Kevin Christensen 
Dated: August ^- , 1993. 
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
By 
Date Filed: August <?C , 1993. 
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ADDENDUM F 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUMggj Judi*# District 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, 
Defendant. 
SEP 1 0 1993 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
AND COMMITMENT *v 
Case No. 891900667 3^5*^1 
The above-named Defendant, having pled guilty to the following 
offenses: 
Count 1: MANSLAUGHTER - a Second Degree Felony. 
Count 2: EVIDENCE TAMPERING - a Second Degree Felony; and 
The Defendant, being present and represented by counsel and 
there being no legal reason why sentence in this matter should not 
be imposed; it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
Basic Sentence. 
Count 1: 
1. The Defendant shall be imprisoned in the Utah State 
Prison for a term of not less than one (1) and not more 
than fifteen (15) years. 
2. The Defendant shall pay a fine of $10,000.00, together 
with an 85% surcharge in the amount of $8,500.00, for a 
total amount of $18,500.00 pursuant to Section 76-3-
201(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
Count 2: 
1. The Defendant shall be imprisoned in the Utah State 
Prison for a term of not less than one (1) and not more 
than fifteen (15) years. 
2. The Defendant shall pay a fine of $10,000.00, together 
with an 85% surcharge in the amount of $8,500.00, for a 
total amount of $18,500.00 pursuant to Section 76-3-
201(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
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The Defendant shall pay restitution to Cache County in 
the amount of $160,000.00. 
2. The Defendant shall pay restitution to Victoria DeLeon in 
the amount of $750.00 for funeral and burial expenses for 
the victim. 
3. This sentence for Count 2 of Evidence Tampering shall run 
consecutively after the Defendant has served the sentence 
for Count 1 of Manslaughter. 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD OF PARDONS: 
1. It is the recommendation of this Court that the Defendant 
receive credit for time previously served of six (6) 
years and eleven (11) months. (The Defendant has been 
incarcerated at the Cache County Jail from October 23, 
1986 until his sentencing, May 17, 1989. He was then 
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison until November, 
1991, when the case was remanded back to the District 
Court on Appeal. At that time, he was returned to the 
Cache County Jail where he has remained incarcerated 
until his present sentencing.) 
2. It is further recommended that the Defendant be 
considered for a mental health treatment program while at 
the Utah State Prison. 
CUSTODY REMAND 
The Defendant is hereby remanded to the custody of the Cache 
County Sheriff to be transported to the Utah State Prison. 
Ordered this ^tJ day of September, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
AEPBOVED AS TO FORM: 
ARDEN W. LAORI^ZEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
?££</£ /•' 
JENKINS 
'Cache County Attorney 
mm a*. 
ADDENDUM G 
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for the Utah Board of Pardons 
160 East 300 South - Sixth Floor 
PO Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, 
PETITIONER, 
STATE OF UTAH and the UTAH 
STATE BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLE, 
RESPONDENTS. 
: FINDINGS OF FACT, 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
: AND FINAL ORDER 
Case No. 960903535 HC 
: Judge Pat B. Brian 
This matter came before the Court on September 3, 1996 at 
2:00 p.m., to consider Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary 
Relief and Respondents' motions to dismiss for payment of filing 
fee and for failure to comply with the applicable statute of 
limitations. Petitioner was present and represented pro se. The 
Utah Board of Pardons and Parole was represented by Assistant 
Attorney General Lorenzo K. Miller, and the State of Utah was 
represented by Assistant Attorney General David E. Yocom. 
The Court, having thoroughly read all memoranda, documents, 
and pleadings, having reviewed the law applicable to this case, 
having heard oral argument from the parties, and being familiar 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
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with Petitioner's criminal proceedings, issued its decisions and 
judgment. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now makes the following 
findings and conclusions. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Petitioner Steven Ray James, inmate no. 19435, is 
lawfully incarcerated at the Utah State Prison under a valid 
judgment and commitment order issued by this court. 
2. Petitioner was arrested on October 23, 1986, and after a 
jury trial he was convicted of Criminal Homicide, a capital 
offense, and sentenced to serve life in prison. 
3. The Utah Supreme Court, however, reversed Petitioner's 
conviction and remanded the case back to this court for further 
proceedings. 
4. Subsequently, through a plea bargain agreement, 
Petitioner pled guilty to Manslaughter, a second degree felony, and 
Tampering with Evidence, also a second degree felony. In return 
for his plea, the State dismissed the capital offense. 
5. After a lengthy colloquy with the Petitioner, and 
determining that his plea was knowing and voluntary, the Court 
accepted Petitioner's plea and set the case for sentencing. 
6. On September 8, 1993, this Court sentenced Petitioner to 
serve two indeterminate terms of imprisonment at the Utah State 
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Prison, and it ordered that both sentences to run consecutively to 
each other. 
7. From his arrest on October 23, 1986, until his second 
commitment on September 8, 1993, Petitioner remained in state 
custody and was not released from incarceration. 
8. On February 11, 1994, Petitioner appeared before the Utah 
Board of Pardons and Parole for an original parole-grant hearing. 
9. At that time, the Board calculated Petitioner's 
expiration dates as being October 22, 2001 (for the manslaughter 
conviction), and October 21, 2016 (for the tampering conviction). 
10. These calculations were based upon the information that 
Petitioner served approximately 2512 days prior to his September 8, 
1993 commitment (e.g., from October 23, 1986 to September 8, 1993). 
11. At the conclusion of the parole hearing, the hearing 
officer took Petitioner's case under advisement and issued 
Petitioner an interim disposition form indicating the above-
mentioned expiration dates. 
12. On February 24, 1994, the full Board made its decision 
and issued a second disposition form. 
13. This form incorrectly stated that Petitioner's expiration 
dates were September 7, 2 008, and September 6, 202:3 which would be 
the correct dates had Petitioner not been given credit for time 
served prior to the September 8, 1993 commitment date. 
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14. Petitioner never notified the Board of the 
miscalculations, but instead filed the instant action against the 
Board claiming that his rights had been violated because the Board 
was refusing to grant credit for time served as ordered by this 
court. 
15. Subsequently, the Board reviewed Petitioner's claims and 
determined that the disposition form, dated February 24, 1994, was 
incorrect, and it corrected the clerical errors and issued a new 
disposition form reflecting the corrections. 
16. The amended disposition form indicates that Petitioner's 
sentences will expire on October 21, 2001, for the manslaughter 
conviction, and on October 20, 2016, for the tampering conviction, 
which is exactly 3 0 years (minus three days) from the date 
Petitioner was first arrested and placed in state custody for the 
charged offenses. 
17. On September 3, 1996, Petitioner paid the $120.00 filing 
fee required under section 21-1-5(1) (a) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
18. In addition to the claims against the Board, Petitioner 
also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he 
allowed petitioner to plea to the tampering charge when the statute 
of limitations for that crime had allegedly run. 
19. Petitioner asserts that he should not be forced to serve 
the 1-15 year consecutive sentence for the tampering conviction 
because he could not have been tried on that offense had he not 
pled guilty. 
0 0 018 0 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The first issue that must be resolved in this case is the 
proper filing fee. The Court has reviewed Petitioner's prison 
financial statement, and based upon that record and Petitioner's 
in court statements, the Court determines that Petitioner has had 
and continues to have sufficient funds to pay a full filing fee. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner should pay the 
statutory filing fee of $120.00 before proceeding with this 
action. However, in the interest of justice, the Court will 
grant Petitioner until September 10, 1996 to pay the required 
fee. Payment in full by that date will be deemed timely by the 
Court. 
The second issue that must be resolved is Petitioner's 
claims that the Board failed to grant him credit for time served 
prior to his second conviction. The record clearly indicates 
that since Petitioner pointed out the error to the Board, the 
Board reviewed its disposition and amended its Order to reflect 
the proper expiration dates. 
Because the Board has corrected its mistake in this matter 
and has issued a corrected disposition form containing the 
appropriate expiration dates, the parties are correct in 
asserting that this issue is moot and there is nothing left for 
the court ; remedy • : >n these claims Therefore, these claims 
have been resolved and should be dismissed. 
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As to Petitionees post-conviction claims, it appears that 
these claims were raised for the first time approximately 15 days 
after the statute of limitations ran. See Utah Code Ann. §78-
35a-107. From the record, it also appears that Petitioner was 
incarcerated at the prison during the entire one-year period, and 
therefore, the Court believes that Petitioner was unaware of the 
limitation period imposed by the new Section 78-35a-107, having 
neither constructive notice nor actual notice of the recent 
legislation. Furthermore, the Court does not believe that a 15-
day delay in bringing this type of action was unreasonable under 
the circumstances of Petitioner's case. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that under the "interest of 
justice" provisions of section 78-35a-107 (3), this case should 
not be time barred. 
Having determined that the statute of limitations found in 
section 78-35a-107 does not bar the post-conviction claims, the 
Court nevertheless concludes that Petitioner's claims should be 
dismissed. Here Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered 
into an agreement with the State to plead guilty to one count of 
Manslaughter and one count of Tampering with a Witness, and in 
exchange for that plea, the State dismissed the capital charge 
against him. As a result of the plea agreement, Petitioner was 
sentenced to serve two consecutive 15-year terms rather than a 
6 
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possible life sentence had he been convicted of the capital 
offense. 
In making the plea agreement, Petitioner waived any defenses 
he may have had to the crimes to which be pled and he accepted 
the judgment of guilty for those offenses. Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that Petitioner's plea of guilty to the tampering 
charge waived any right Petitioner may have had to attack the 
conviction, and he is therefore collaterally barred from seeking 
habeas corpus relief at this time. 
Finally, Petitioner claims that the Court failed to order 
the statutory 85% surcharge when imposing the fine in his case, 
and therefore, the State is barred from collecting that fee. The 
Court concludes that Petitioner's position may have some merit; 
and, therefore, the Court believes that the fee should not be 
collected unless the Board of Pardons orders otherwise. In that 
event, the Board should file an objection with this Court. 
Based on the foregoing, the court now makes the following 
order: 
FINAL ORDER 
1. The statutory surcharges that should have been assessed 
to each of Petitioner's two $10,000.00 fines, shall not be 
collected. However, if the Utah Board of Pardons objects to this 
order, the Board should file an objection with this Court, and 
the matter will come back before the Court for final resolution. 
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2. The relief Petitioner seeks regarding credit for time 
served has already been granted, making this issue moot, and 
therefore, the relief Petitioner seeks is denied with prejudice. 
3. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss based upon the statute 
of limitations contained in Section 78-35-107 is denied for the 
reasons stated above. 
4. Petitioner's Post-Conviction claims are deemed to be 
without merit, and therefore, the relief Petitioner seeks on 
those claims is denied with prejudice. 
5. All other claims not specifically addressed herein are 
also deemed to be without merit and are also denied with 
prejudice. 
6. All issues resolved, this case is hereby dismissed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, this /fcfl day of September, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
k^. 
HONORABLE T>AT B T - B T 5 — 
Third Judicial District^Judcfe^.y" 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
k^l 
STEVEN RAY JAMES 
Attorney Pro £E 
Ocgn\ 
DATE 
diL%> 
IVID E. YO 
A t t o r n e y f o 
ZsSerr. IML, 
DATE 
e S t a t e 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this^g^r^day of September 1996, a 
true and accurate, unsigned copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL ORDER was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to: 
STEVEN RAY JAMES #19435 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
PO BOX 250 
DRAPER UTAH 84 020 
and hand delivered to: 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E. 300 S. 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84114 
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ADDENDUM H 
ORIGINAL 
FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Steven Ray James, and any and
 t 
all others residing at 
160 East 500 North, 
Basement Apartment 
Logan, UT 
Defendant, 
> AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
i Criminal No* 
The undersigned, under information and belief, first being duly 
sworn, deposes and says: 
That I, Craig Andrews, have worked for the Logan City 
Police Department more than twelve years. I am currently working . 
as Sergeant in the Detective Division in tharge f major crime 
investigations. I have received specialized training in the 
areas of homicides and their investigations. I am personally 
acquainted with the facts and circumstances of this case. 
1 . That your affiant was contacted by Steven Ray James, of 
160 East 500 North, Logan, UT, on August 26, 1986. Mr James 
informed your affiant that: 
a. That the defendant resides at 160 East 500 North, Logan, 
UT together with Victoria DeLeon and their 3 month old 
infant son, Steven Roy James, born on May 22, 1986. 
b. The defendant drove his vehicle, white over blue 
cadillac, together with his said infant son to Osco Drug in 
Logan, Utah at approximately 12:45 p.m. to secure spackling 
compound to finish a home remodeling project. 
t RIGINAL 
c* The defendant left his said infant son in the vehicle 
which was parked under a tree on 100 East between 400 and 
500 North, just west of Osco Drug while he went into the 
drug store to make his purchases* When Mr* James left his 
infant son, the baby was dressed in a blue t-shirt, had on a 
disposable diaper, was wrapped in a white blanket with pink 
and blue stripes* The baby, when last seen by the defendant, 
was in an infant carrier with a bottle, in the front seat of 
Mr. James' Cadillac. Mr* James believes that the vehicle 
was unlocked and the windows slightly open* 
d* Mr* James returned to the car after a five to six 
minutes and observed that the child was no longer in 
the car* The defendant then stated he shut the car door, 
went back into Osco Drug to the pay phone and dialed 911 and 
reported the child, Steven Roy James, had been kidnapped* 
2* Through your affiant's investigation it appears that 
based on the following reasons, the kidnapping did not occur in 
the manner described by Mr* James and that Mr* James was not 
being completely honest in his account: 
a* That according to various witnesses interviewed, the car 
would have been under observation during most of the time 
period beginning at 12:45 p.m on August 26, 1986, when the 
defendant exited the car until he returned to the car 
approximately five to six minutes later, when he discovered 
the child missing* During interviews with various 
witnesses, only one witness claimed to observe anyone near 
or about the vehicle the child was removed from* Your 
affiant, during the course of the investigation, was able to 
eliminate this witnesses claim* 
b* That during various interviews with the defendant, 
Steven Ray James, the defendant significantly altered his 
accounts of the sequence of events which took place on the 
morning prior to the kidnapping; specifically he initially 
indicated that he had taken a bath between 10:00 and 10:30 
a.m. and began working on the remodeling project in the 
bathroom at approximately 10:00 to 10:30 a.m. He later 
indicated that he had taken his bath at 12:30 p.m* Still 
later, he indicated that he had taken his bath around 10:45 
to 11:15 a*m* and worked on the bathroom around 9:00 a.m. 
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3. The defendant indicated to your affiant that the 
defendant had been engaged in remodeling the bathroom at his 
residence located at 160 East 500 North, Logan, Utah, which 
included painting, and also during that same time period, had 
been engaged I painting his previous residence in Preston, 
Idaho. 
4. On October 11, 1986, shortly before noon, the body of a 
-ad infant, approximatel months nf agt; „ clad in a blue 
t-shirt, and meeting the general description of the Steven Roy 
James, was found vest of Logan at the Valley View Boat Dock. The 
body was wrapped in a cloth material having, what appears to be, 
paint spots and was tied with an orange electrical cord. 
Because of the aforementioned facts and circumstances your 
Affiant, believes that it is reasonable and prude n I I \ e a i r I" i 1 1 • \ 
defendant's residence and premises to ascertain the presence of 
any paint or paint related materials and similar cords and any 
and all other evidence which may relate the defendant to the 
crimes of Murder in the First Degree, Section 76-5-202, 
U.C.A. 1953 as amended, and Obstruction of Justice, Section 
76-8-306, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, and or Tampering with Evidence, 
Section 76-8-510, U.C.A. 1953 as amended. Your affiant, 
therefore, requests permission to search the residence described 
as 160 East 500 North, basement apartment, Logan, Utah together 
with all out buildings, and vehicles controlled by the defendant, 
Steven Ray James. 
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5. On October 11, 1986, at approximately 5:45 p.m., your 
affiant talked with Victoria DeLeon, the mother of 3 month old 
Steven Roy James. Victoria gave verbal permission to your 
affiant to search the residence, the garage and the vehicles 
located at 160 East 500 North, Logan, Utah, 
DATED THIS 11TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 1986* 
Craig R. Andrews, Sergeant 
Logan City Police Department 
SWORN TO BEFORE ME, AND SUBSCRIBED IN MY PRESENCE THIS 11TH DAY 
OF OCTOBER, 1986.
 A _, / 
\ 5 
ADDENDUM I 
SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY JAMES 
DOB: 02/27/52 
160 EAST 500 NORTH 
LOGAN, UT 84321 
Defendant, ; 
i AFFIDAVIT FOR WARRANT 
i OF ARREST 
The undersigned, under information and belief, being duly 
sworn deposes and says: 
1* That your Affiant is Sergeant Craig R. Andrews, a Police 
Officer employed by the Logan City Police Department for the last 
thirteen years. That your Affiant is currently assigned to 
Investigations and serves as supervisory officer of this 
Division. That your Affiant has received specialized training in 
the area i homicide investigations and that your Affiant has 
personally investigated this case. 
That your Affiant has probable cause to believe that on 
or about August 26, 1986, the above named defendant, committed 
the crime of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, in 
violation of Section 76-5-202 (l)(h), U.C.A. 1953 as amended, a 
Capital Offense. The facts tending » establish grounds for 
issuance of a warrant of arrest are as follows: 
2. On August ,'fi 19 06! at. I2I?I4 p.m., the Logan City Police 
Department received a telephone report from Steven Ray James that 
his three month old male child had been taken from his car while 
parked at Osco Drug on <« * in Logan, Utah. That your 
Affiant personally interviewed Steven Ray James on this same date 
and received the following detailed report. 
A* Steven Ray James stated that on August 26, 1986 around 
1:00 p.m., he drove his 1972 White over Blue Cadillac to 
Osco Drug to make a purchase of Dap putty supplies for a 
home repair project he was working on. Accompanying Mr. 
James at this time was his three month old son, Steven Roy 
James, and the family dog, Rambo. Mr. James pulled into the 
Osco Drug parking lot. Unable to find a shaded parking 
space, Mr. James pulled back onto the street and parked 
under a shade tree at approximately 460 North 100 East. Mr. 
James exited his vehicle leaving his son and family dog 
inside. The vehicle was left unlocked and the windows 
slightly unrolled for ventilation. Mr. James went into Osco 
Drug, made a purchase and returned to his vehicle. Mr. 
James estimates that he was away from his vehicle four to 
six minutes. Upon returning and opening the drivers door, 
Mr. James noticed his baby missing from the front seat of 
his vehicle. He stated he observed no one suspicious in the 
area. Still in the vehicle was the family dog, the child's 
infant seat, and a baby bottle. Mr. James returned to Osco 
Drug and made an emergency call to the Police Department's 
Central Dispatch to report the disappearance. 
B. Mr. James described his infant son as approximately 
three months of age having been born on May 22, 1986 in 
Preston, Idaho. The baby was a white male, weighing 12-14 
pounds, 21 inches long, blue eyes, brown hair, with a red 
birth mark on the back of his head. The child's clothing 
consisted of a disposable diaper and a medium blue pullover 
t-shirt. Also missing with the baby was a multi-colored 
white, pink, blue and yellow flannel receiving blanket. Mr. 
James was questioned concerning other possible items missing 
from the vehicle. He reported that no other items were 
missing from his vehicle. 
3. That over the next several weeks, hundreds of case leads 
were received and investigated. No witnesses could be located to 
substantiate Steven James9 report that anyone had entered his 
vehicle while it was parked at the Osco Drug store. Several 
witnesses were located that were in the vicinity of Osco, but 
none had observed an abduction. Additionally, no witnesses could 
be located who could confirm seeing the child during the day 
9 
except the child's mother, Victoria DeLeon, who confirmed her 
baby was alive and well when she had left for work at 5:20 a.m. 
on the morning of August 26, 1986. 
4. That as the investigation continued and Steven Ray James 
and others were interviewed, it was learned that Mr. James had 
been unemployed over the previous five months and that this 
unemployment had placed a financial strain on Mr. James. Adding 
to this pressure was the fact that Mr. James had outstanding 
loans to financial institutions that he was in payment arrears. 
At one time during this period, Mr. James' 1986 Suzuki motorcycle 
was repossessed for non-payment of monthly loan obligations. Mr. 
James additionally admitted to your Affiant, as well as the news 
media, that he was and had been addicted to drugs for most of his 
life. His statements were confirmed during interviews of known 
friends and associates of Steven Ray James as well as during 
review of public arrest records and other documents. Mr. James 
had further admitted that his drug abuse, including the use of 
cocaine, was ongoing until just two to three weeks prior to his 
sons disappearance. 
5. That Carol Bailey, an upstairs neighbor of Steven James, 
at 160 East 500 North, was interviewed. Carol stated that due to 
a broken leg, she had spent a considerable amount of time inside 
her residence after the James family had moved in. During this 
time, Carol Bailey could hear the James baby crying frequently. 
On the day the baby was reported missing, Carol Bailey was home 
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until shortly after 10:00 a.m. when she left for a medical 
appointment* For at least one half hour prior to Bailey's 
departure, she overheard the James baby constantly crying. Carol 
Bailey stated that she was concerned and wished she could go 
downstairs and help with the baby, but was unable to do so 
because of her broken leg. 
6. On October 11, 1986, around 12:00 noon, a report was 
received at Logan Police Central Dispatch of the discovery of a 
dead body believed to be that of a small infant. The body was 
reportedly found by hunters in the Little Bear River, five miles 
west of Logan. Your Affiant responded to this location and 
observed a small cloth covered bundle partially submerged in the 
river, four to five feet from the rivers edge. A Mr. Kevin Homer 
of Syracuse, Utah was interviewed and gave a statement that he 
had been hunting with relatives in this area and had observed 
this bundle submerged in the river. Upon checking the contents, 
he found what appeared to be the remains of an infant. Mr. Homer 
caused that a report be made to law enforcement authorities. The 
bundle and contents were secured until law enforcement 
authorities arrived. 
7. That your Affiant examined the cloth covered bundle and 
what appeared to be remains of a small infant. Your Affiant 
observed that the small infant was clothed in a disposable 
diaper, and a medium blue t-shirt. The infant was covered with a 
small flannel blanket which had white, pink, blue and yellow 
JI 
stripes. The infant was additionally wrapped in what appeared to 
be a white mattress cover* This cover had several plainly 
visible paint splatters and gave the appearance of a paint drop 
cloth. An orange electrical cord was used to bind the bundle 
together. 
8. On October 14, 1986, Victoria DeLeon came to the Logan 
Police Department to observe items of clothing found on the body 
of a small infant discovered on October 11, 1986 in the Little 
Bear River. Victoria DeLeon identified the multicolored flannel 
blanket and the blue t-shirt as being her missing child's 
clothing. 
9. The remains of the deceased infant were transported to 
the State Medical Examiners Office in Salt Lake City for positive 
identification and determination of cause of death. As a result 
of the post-mortem by the Medical Examiners Office and tests 
conducted by the Logan Police Crime Lab and Utah State Crime Lab, 
a positive identification was made that the body was that of the 
missing infant, Steven Roy James. The official cause of death 
was listed as a homicide. 
10. During the course of the investigation, it was learned 
that the Steven Ray James family had moved from 265 South 400 
West, Preston, Idaho to Logan, Utah in early August, 1986. That 
during the move, bedding items from Steven Ray James Preston 
residence had been used to cover furniture. The bedding items 
belonged to a Don Lawhan, who was Steven Ray James' landlord in 
Preston, Idaho. Mr. Lawhan is a painter by profession and had 
used the bedding as paint drop cloths. Mr. Don Lawhan had given 
Mr. Steven James permission to use his bedding items on his move 
to Utah. 
11. On October 11, 1986, your Affiant interviewed Steven Ray 
James* brother, Roy, who resides in Logan, Utah. Mr. Roy James 
related that he had helped his brother move to Logan and 
confirmed using bedding material-paint drop cloths to cover 
furniture. That these drop cloths had been borrowed from Steven 
James' landlord in Preston, Idaho. 
A. Mr. Roy James further related that approximately a week 
or so following the reported abduction of Steven Roy James, 
he and his brother, Steven, went to Steven's apartment, 160 
East 500 North in Logan and picked up several of the paint 
splattered items of bedding-drop cloths and took them to Roy 
James* home where Steve was going to paint a bedroom. 
B. That on October 11, 1986, Detectives Jim Williamson and 
Kevin Christensen of the Logan Police Department picked up 
the paint splattered drop cloths from Mr. Roy James. That 
the bedding drop cloths had paint splatters which were 
visually identical to stains found on the bedding drop cloth 
wrapped around the deceased infant, Steven Roy James. 
12. On October 12, 1986, Detectives Williamson and 
Christensen obtained permission from Don Lawhan to search the 
unoccupied home which he owned in Preston, Idaho. This was the 
home that Steven Ray James had rented when he resided in Preston, 
Idaho. During the search, the Detectives located a mattress 
cover which appeared to have been used as a paint drop cloth. 
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The mattress cover was the same size, color, and had paint stains 
which were visibly identical to the mattress cover found wrapped 
around the infant, Steven Roy James. 
13. On October 14, 1986, Detective Jim Williamson and Lab 
Technician Dr. Kent Glanville interviewed Don Lawhan at the Idaho 
State Crime Lab in Boise, Idaho. Mr. Lawhan was shown several 
items of bedding including the mattress cover-drop cloth found at 
his Preston residence, the bedding items received from Roy James 
and the mattress cover-drop cloth found wrapped around the 
deceased Steven Roy James. Mr. Lawhan positively identified all 
the bedding items as his personal property which he has left at 
his home in Preston, Idaho. Mr. Don Lawhan further stated that 
he had three twin sized mattress pads which he used as paint drop 
cloths where he lived in Preston, Idaho. When he moved to Boise, 
Idaho, he took one of the mattress pads-drop cloths with him. 
The other two were left at the residence in Preston. These 
mattress covers would have been included in the bedding items 
that Lawhan had given Steven Ray James permission to use on his 
move to Logan. The positive identification of the mattress 
covers was made based on size, color, diamond padded stitching, 
paint splatter stains, familiar wear, and other staining known to 
Mr. Lawhan. 
14. That on October 15-17, 1986, using a scientific process 
known as pyrolysis gas chromatography, Logan Police Lab 
Technician Dr. Kent Glanville, matched paint splatter stains 
- i4 
found on the mattress cover Steven Roy James was wrapped in 
against paint splatter stains found on the mattress cover found 
in Preston, Idaho, as well as blue paint samples removed from the 
Preston, Idaho home owned by Don Lawhan and rented by Steven Ray 
James, The paint splatter stains and paint samples from the 
compared items were a positive match. Additionally, the chemical 
makeup of the fibers in the two mattress covers were found to be 
identical. 
15. That your Affiant has conducted a criminal history 
background check on Steven Ray James, date of birth February 27, 
1952. His record shows a criminal history of arrests for violent 
crimes including arrests of drug possession, burglary, theft, 
aggravated battery, kidnapping, child abuse, assaults, and 
others. Steven James* criminal history starts in 1963 at age 11 
and extends into 1984. There is currently an outstanding warrant 
out of the State of California for felony probation violation and 
two outstanding warrants out of the State of Washington for 
theft. 
16. That your Affiant has learned through an individual 
associated with the "Search for Steven Roy James" volunteer 
organization, that prior to the location of the body, the 
defendant Steven Ray James had discussed taking the life of your 
Affiant and then taking his own life. 
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17. That on October 22, 1986, your Affiant received a phone 
call from Sue Owen, a probation officer with the State of 
California Probation Department* She confirmed that in May of 
1973, Steven Ray James was sentenced for the felony crime of 
false imprisonment* The felony conviction resulted from actions 
of Steven Ray James in November of 1972 wherein Steven James was 
arrested for the kidnapping of an adult woman at gun point and 
forcing her into a car. 
18. That your Affiant has reviewed the evidence and facts 
of this case with the Office of the Cache County Attorney. It is 
the opinion of their office and of your Affiant that probable 
cause has been shown to establish that the crime of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, Section 76-5-202 (l)(h), 
O.C.A. 1953 as amended, a Capital Offense, has been committed and 
further that the defendant Steven Ray James was responsible for 
the murder of Steven Roy James and the attempted coverup of the 
crime• 
19. Based upon the information contained herewithin this 
affidavit, a warrant of arrest is hereby requested to bring said 
defendant before the Court. It is further requested that due to 
the following factors, the defendant be held without bail: 
r i6 
A. The defendant is currently on probation for a felony 
crime in the State of California and that a warrant for his 
arrest has been issued. 
B. The defendant committed a capital felony while on 
probation. 
C. The defendant has made comments concerning death threats 
against individuals involved in the investigation of this 
case. 
DATED this n day of October, 1986. 
LLsj^in. (jL{tf,j,«L~ 
W ^ 
Sgt. Craig^ft. Andrews, Investigator 
Logan City Police Department 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 2 3> 
1986. 
day of October, 
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